We study the influence of systematic probability misestimation on complex financial investment decisions on the context of structured financial products. Structured products have in recent years become more and more complex. We study the question whether this complexity might be a sophisticated method to exploit systematic biases in probability estimation of investors in order to make products look safer and more attractive than they actually are. We present results of an experiment that focused on probability estimates in the context of certain classes of structured products, in particular barrier reverse convertibles, bonus certificates and worst-of basket certificates. We also investigated potential ways to de-bias investors by providing additional information.
Introduction
Every investment decision involves (explicitly or implicitly) to estimate certain risks. Estimates for the probability of increasing or decreasing stock markets depend mostly on the experience of the investor and the biases that he shows. 1 Modern financial products require much more demanding tasks regarding the estimation of probabilities which makes them an interesting and rewarding field of investigation. In this article we mainly study structured financial products, also
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known as equity-or index linked securities. They are certificates that pay at maturity a return that depends in a predefined way on the development of one or more assets, the underlyings. As simple example take a capital protected product: it returns at maturity at least the invested amount plus a share of the gains of the S&P 500 (say 70%), if there are any. Structured products are already a very popular investment form in Europe, in particular in Germany and Switzerland where they account for 6-8% of all invested assets. In the US, where regulatory constraints were slowing down the development and the market for structured products is still only half as big as in Germany, they have now reached an annually growth rate of around 30%. There is a huge literature on problems related to the pricing of structured products. Recently, there are also some empirical studies that measure mis-pricing, i.e. the difference between the fair value of a structured product and the price for which it is issued by a bank [4, 13, 12] . Many of the most successful structured products are surprisingly complicated. That this cannot be easily explained with classical investment models has been found in several empirical [2, 1] and theoretical studies [5] . In this article we focus on an explanation for their success which has previously not been examined, but is all too obvious to practitioners: systematic probability mis-estimation of the probabilities that determine the payoff of these products. The method we use to elicit this connection are computer-based laboratory experiments with test subjects, since this seems to be the only way to obtain data not only on investment decisions, but also on probability estimates. Payoffs of selected structured products (x-axis: return of underlying at maturity; dotted line: payoff of underlying): barrier reverse convertibles pay a fixed interest ("coupon"). Moreover the invested amount is fully returned at maturity unless the price of the underlying falls at some point below a predefined barrier level. In this case, at maturity only the value of the underlying (plus the coupon) is paid back. Bonus certificates pay a certain participation rate on the underlying. Moreover, the product is capital protected unless the underlying falls below the barrier.
Probability estimates for the return distribution of assets have been studied al-ready for a long time, both for historic and also for forecast probabilities, see, e.g., [7, 9, 10, 11] . Our study focuses on more complex probability estimates that are relevant to the types of structured products that are particularly popular on the Swiss and German markets -at present arguably the most developed markets for structured products worldwide. We expect therefore that our findings are of relevance also for other markets, where the products under consideration are newer. Particularly, we are studying barrier reverse convertibles (which are equivalent to barrier discount certificates), bonus certificates and their variants with a worst-of basket. The payoffs of these products are explained in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . It is important to mention that they are among the most popular types of structured products for the retail market and definitely not just mere curiosities. 2 
Barrier touched
Payoff at maturity Time Underlying B Underlying A Figure 2 : Worst-of baskets determine barrier and payoff with respect to the worst performing asset in the basket. In the above example the barrier has been touched, since underlying B was below the barrier at some point. The final payoff is given by underlying A, since at maturity it is the worst asset in the basket.
The key idea of our experiment was to ask subjects to estimate probabilities related to the payoff of such products (in particular the probability that a certain barrier will be reached) and to combine this with hypothetical investment decisions on structured products. We also used some de-biasing techniques to test if investment decisions could potentially be improved by providing additional information. The main findings are that probability mis-estimation, as practitioners were expecting, seems to be the most important factor explaining the attractiveness of the types of structured products under investigation, however, often in a surprising way. In particular we found that subjects estimated the correlation between assets in a bas- 2 In the USA, barrier reverse convertibles had a share of 18.37% on all issued structured products of the year 2006. In Germany, bonus certificates had a share of 19.3% on all structured products (outstanding volume November 2007, N = 270 254). There are no numbers available for barrier reverse convertibles or worst-of baskets, but the latter had a share of 5.2% on the trading volume of structured products on the Stuttgart stock exchange which specializes in structured products and reverse convertibles (including barrier reverse convertibles) had a share of 42.3% on the outstanding volume in November 2007. In Switzerland, 9.9% of all emitted structured products were bonus certificates and 30.5% barrier reverse convertibles (March-November 2007, N = 47 362), 29.4% of the products listed in April 2007 were worst-of baskets [5, 12] . 4 
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
ket surprisingly well, however, the failed to apply this ability in their judgment on worst-of basket certificates. Additional information turned out to be useful for de-biasing of certain aspects only. In the next section we explain the set-up of our experiment and the relevant tasks the subjects had to perform. In Section 3 we present the results regarding the attractiveness of barrier products and worst-of baskets and to what extend it is possible to de-bias investors.
Experimental setup
The experiment was eliciting probability estimates for past events, hypothetical investment decisions regarding structured products and finally information about the subjects. In the following subsections we present the general setup and the relevant tasks the subjects had to perform.
Setup and incentives
The experiments were conducted between October 2007 and March 2008 at the laboratories of our university. The main experiment consisted of a paper-and pencil comprehension test followed by a computer-based experiment using z-Tree [3] . Subjects were N = 51 undergraduate students of economics, partially recruited and paid as usual subjects, partially participating on the experiment as part of a lecture on structured products. The experiment was incentive-compatible. 3 Payments were between approximately 10 USD and 80 USD for a session of around one hour. The initial comprehension test was checked before the computer experiment started. The students were then asked to correct their answers if needed and in some cases hints were given. In this way we made sure that all participants were capable of understanding the key probabilities to be estimated later and the features of the structured products (barriers and worst-of baskets). We chose economics students as test subjects since we expected them to understand the tasks better than average students. Also if they showed biases, we could assume that average private investors who typically do not have a background in economics would be at least as biased in their decisions.
Probability estimates
We asked the participants to estimate a number of historic probabilities that are relevant for the attractiveness of structured products. A typical question was to estimate the probabilities for the following two events:
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• The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) falls during a period of one year at some point below 90% of its initial price.
• The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is at the end of a period of one year below 90% of its initial price.
The time period over which this probability was computed ) was states to the participants, thus there was always a correct answer to these estimates, and the elicited estimates should not be biased by any expectations of the future development of the financial markets. We chose the DJIA as typical example because it was a well-known index among our participants. 20 years of data were chosen because in this way bull and bear markets were leveling out sufficiently well. The described estimates were repeated with several variants. Table 1 gives an overview over the probability estimates of this type that were asked. Probabilities for some of these assets were computed using a slightly shorter time horizon, since, e.g., the SMI was only introduced in April 1993. Table 1 : Overview on the probability estimates in the test for single underlyings (DJIA, Novartis and an artificial index) and for worst-of baskets. In each case the probability for touching a barrier and for being below the barrier at maturity was elicited.
We checked for order effects in a classroom pretest with a larger number of participants (N = 74) and only four key questions (corresponding to the DJIA question with barriers at 80% and 90%), but did not find a significant difference when reverting the order. (We mention that the estimates in the classroom experiment were very similar to the laboratory experiment, although no incentive was given and conditions were less controlled.) To test whether biases in the estimates are simply due to insufficient knowledge of the financial markets or a genuine bias in probability estimates we also asked the questions for an artificial index with explicitly stated underlying process (binomial with given probabilities and monthly returns, see Sec. 3.1).
To elicit correlation estimates for different assets (which is crucial in estimating the attractiveness of worst-of baskets) we asked for the probability p cond that one of the assets has a positive monthly return given that the other one has a positive monthly return. We used this probability as proxy for two reasons: first, eliciting it was closer to the other tasks in the experiment and second, we did not need to assume any knowledge about statistics, in particular the definition of the correlation coefficient. p cond is a reasonable proxy for the correlation: on average over all pairs of stocks in the SMI a linear regression gives R 2 = 42.2% with p < 0.001. The linear regression is given by
We used this equations to convert the answers of the participants into correlation coefficients.
In the case of stock market indices, we used DJ Euro Stoxx 50, MSCI UK, Shanghai Shares, Dax 30, Nikkei 255, S&P500, DJIA, SMI and HSBC India. Here we obtained the regression equation
with R 2 = 79.4% and p < 0.001. As asset pairs we chose well-known Swiss stocks of different, similar or the same industrial sector (Ciba/Clariant, Richemont/Swisscom, Novartis/Roche). The subjects were informed about the sectors of each company. As indices, we chose two index pairs of high and low correlation (DAX/SMI and HSBC India/Nikkei 225).
In the case of the worst-of baskets, we elicited probabilities similar to the single underlyings (see Table 1 ).
Preferences and judgements on structured products
We introduced four structured products to the subjects:
1. A bonus certificate on the DJIA with 100% participation and a barrier level of 80%. The probability for touching the barrier was given.
2. A bonus certificate on a non-specified index with 100% participation and a barrier level of 80%, where the probability for touching the barrier was given as the probability estimate of the subject for the DJIA.
3. A bonus certificate on the SMI with 100% participation and a barrier level of 80% without information on the probability to hit the barrier.
4. A worst-of basket barrier discount certificate with three years to maturity and a 65% barrier level for the underlyings S&P500, DJ Euro Stoxx 50, Nikkei 225 and the Swiss Market Index (SMI). 4 
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After each explanation we asked the participants how risky they perceive the product and either whether they would like to invest into the product or (in the case of the worst-of basket) whether they would prefer to invest into the product or directly into the underlying assets.
Risk aversion
We measured several personal characteristics of the subjects. For the current study most interesting is the measurement of risk aversion. We used the same elicitation method as in [6] by asking preferences for the pairs of lotteries displayed in Table 2 . At the end of the experiment every participant had a 50% chance to play one of his selected lotteries, where the lottery was chosen by a roll of a dice. The amount won was in addition to the potential payoff for the probability estimation task. The distribution of risk attitudes is shown in Fig. 3 .
Results
We present the main results of our experiment in order to shed light on the attractiveness and specific features of barrier products and worst-of baskets. Finally we examine potential ways to de-bias investors.
Why are barrier features attractive?
To understand the attractiveness of barrier features in structured products, we first take a look on the probability estimates for touching a barrier before maturity. The median estimates for the DJIA as underlying and one year to maturity can be found 8
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Figure 3: Distribution of risk attitudes among the subjects: the number denotes the first lottery pair where the subject preferred lottery B over lottery A. The variable ∆ denotes the difference between the expected values of both lotteries.
in Table 3 for three barrier levels (90%, 80%, 75%). We see that contrary to the expectations the participants did not underestimate the probability to hit a barrier, but sometimes even substantially overestimated this probability.
Real prob. Estimate DJIA below: 90% 80% 75% 90% 80% 75% at some point: 29.6% 19.2% 13.8% 50.0% 32.5% 22.6% Table 3 : Probability estimates for the DJIA for falling prices and a maturity of one year.
One might argue, however, that investment decisions are relative in nature, so that we also have to take into account alternatives, e.g. investing directly into the underlying. How did the subjects think about the probability that the index will be below a given value not at some point, but at maturity? Table 4 shows these values. Moreover, we computed the relative difference between both probabilities. This relative difference is important when decisions are made on whether a limited protection that, e.g., a bonus certificate offers is attractive.
Here we see that this relative difference becomes surprisingly large when the barrier level is low, but the estimates do not reflect this and assume a small relative difference of around 2.5 to 3. In an empirical study on barrier reverse convertibles in Switzerland it has been found that barrier levels of 75% were most frequent [12] . The attractiveness of such products could be explained with the relative underestimation of the probability to Table 5 : Relative difference between touching a barrier and underperforming at maturity for the Novartis stock.
Is this phenomenon a general bias in estimating probabilities or is it merely a consequence insufficient knowledge about the price movements of financial assets? To test this, we asked the same questions for an artificial index with a defined price movement: every month the index went up 12% with probability 1/2 and down 5% with probability 1/2. (The process was chosen such that mean and variance were of similar size as for stocks.) Again, the estimates of the subjects failed to capture the increase in the relative difference for low barriers, asTable 6 shows. Table 6 : Relative difference between touching a barrier and underperforming at maturity for the artificial index.
We summarize the underestimation of the relative difference for the three underly- Relative difference between the probability to hit a barrier and the probability to be below the barrier at maturity for various assets and barrier levels. In all cases real values exceed estimated values by a large factor for low barrier levels.
Why are there no structured products with barriers above 100%? Of course, they would have to look different, but there is certainly no lack of creativity in financial engineering and not every structured product just offers a fixed participation in gains: many of the most popular products have a cap, i.e. a largest possible gain, also there are "outperformance" certificates that have first an overproportional increase in payoff and then a cap. None of these types, however, comes with a barrier feature in gains. The reason might be that there is no clear mis-estimation of the relative difference of barrier and maturity probability in gains (compare Table 7 ). What we do see, however, is that gains are typically underestimated which makes capped products attractive. Table 7 : Relative difference between touching a barrier and overperforming at maturity for the DJIA.
Why do most structured products have usually a time to maturity of one year (see, e.g., [12] ), whereas capital protected products have typically more than one year to maturity? Let us look at the probability estimates for the DJIA within 12, 24 and 36 months (Table 8) . We notice that the general feature of underestimating the relative difference is persistent, independent of the time to maturity. The absolute estimates for both touching the barrier as for being below the barrier at maturity are getting more and more pessimistic when we extend maturity. Thus investments that involve potential losses (whether partially protected by a barrier feature or with full exposure) seem less and less attractive if the investment horizon grows. It is therefore understandable that banks frame investment decisions on a yearly basis and structured products have typically a maturity of mostly one year. Table 8 : Relative difference between touching a barrier and underperforming at maturity for the DJIA over 12, 24 and 36 months.
For (fully) capital protected products longer time to maturity is not reducing attractiveness since they explicitly exclude the possibility of a loss. Very much to the contrary, these products gain attractiveness for longer time to maturity, since the protection they grant is perceived as more important (i.e. more likely to be needed) than it actually is! So far, we have reported results on probability estimates and have used them to explain the popularity of certain features of structured products. -But do probability estimates really influence investment decisions or the perception of risk or are other factors, like risk attitudes, much more important for these decisions?
To answer this question, we asked participants to judge the riskiness of bonus certificates with 100% participation on an underlying stock market index with a barrier level of 80%. 5 In the first condition the underlying was specified as SMI. No additional information was given, instead we asked the participants (at a different point during the experiment) for their probability estimates for touching an 80% barrier or ending below 80% at maturity, in the same way as described above for the other underlyings. If our above hypothesis was correct, we would expect that subjects with a larger relative difference in their probability estimates would judge the product to 12
be more risky. Alternatively, a higher level of perceived risk could just be explained by higher risk aversion or by general pessimism on stocks. Therefore we used the risk aversion as measured by our lottery task and the estimates for an increase of the DJIA by at least 20% at maturity ("outperformance estimate") as alternative independent variables. The linear regression results (see Table 9 ) show that the only significant factor is the relative difference of the probability estimates. We also checked whether the probability estimates, rather than their relative difference have a significant impact, but this was not the case. Table 9 : Relative differences of probability estimates between touching a barrier and ending below at a maturity are the only significant factor for perceived riskiness of bonus certificates.
Why are worst-of baskets attractive?
The average performance of a worst-of basket depends not only on the performance of its components, but also on their correlation: if the assets in the basket have a low correlation, it is more likely that one of them will touch the barrier, and it is also more likely that the worst performing asset yields a low return. Estimating the average performance of an asset might already by difficult for private investors. Estimating the probability to hit a barrier is, as we have seen in the previous section, even more difficult. But estimating the correlation between assets seems to be virtually impossible for investors that do not have a solid background in finance or at least longstanding experience on the financial market. If the correlation between assets is overestimated, it is then not surprising that worst-of baskets are perceived as overly attractive. As we will see, this natural explanation cannot be confirmed with our data: in fact, the test subjects were surprisingly good in estimating correlations between different asset classes. Instead of asking directly for the correlation coefficient between assets we used the indirect method described in Section 2.1. The subjects had to estimate correlation for three pairs of well-known Swiss stocks (Table 10 ) and two pairs of international stock market indices (Table 11) . The overall quality of the estimates was better than expected: 55% of the estimates were too high and 45% too low (Table 12 ). The correlation between stocks was on average slightly overestimated, the correlation between indices slightly underestimated. The overestimation of the stock correlation was, however, not significant on a 10% level when using a t-test These results suggest that overestimating correlations cannot explain the popularity of worst-of structures. But can subjects apply their good intuition for correlation to situations where they have to estimate the probability that a worst-of basket will touch a barrier? We asked the subjects to estimate the probability to hit an 80% barrier within a year for baskets of three Swiss stocks and three international indices. When comparing to their estimates for a comparable single Swiss stock and a single comparable international index, the result was clear (Table 13) : the subjects seemed not to take into account in their estimates that the probability increased due to the low correlation of the stocks that they had previously estimated reasonably well. In fact, their estimates for the probability to touch the barrier were statistically not significant larger for a three stocks basket than for the single stock. Table 13 : Probability estimates for touching an 80% barrier for two worst-of baskets and two comparable single assets. The subjects seem to neglect the correlation effect entirely and consequently underestimate the probability that the barrier is touched for the worst-of baskets.
In the case of the stock market indices the result was even stronger: the estimated probability for the basket was significantly lower than for the single index (Singlesided Wilcoxon signed-ranked test gives p = 0.028. Single-sided t-test gives p = 0.034.) This might be connected to a home bias, since the index basket contained the Swiss SMI: of course, even with a home bias it should be clear that a worstof basket that also contains foreign indices shouldn't be less risky than one of the foreign indices, but this was obviously not taken into account by the subjects. Their knowledge about the correlation was simply not applied when estimating the probability to touch the barrier. Given these results, the most likely explanation for the attractiveness of worstof baskets is that the probability of touching a barrier (typically leading to a loss of capital protection) is underestimated (relative to the probability that a single asset touches the barrier) since correlation effects are ignored by investors. This underestimation reduces the perceived riskiness of worst-of products, thus leading to a positive investment decision.
To test this hypothesis, we asked the subjects (N = 50) whether they would prefer to invest an amount of 10 000 CHF (approximately 10 000 USD) for three years into a worst-of barrier reverse convertible with four underlying indices (S&P 500, DJ Euro Stoxx 50, Nikkei 225 and SMI), a barrier level of 65% and a yearly coupon of 9.75% or directly into these indices. We also asked them to estimate the probability that one of these indices would touch the barrier and the probability that the indices will outperform the 9.75% of the coupon. Finally, we asked how risky they perceived the product on a scale from 1 to 10. We tested what factors influence their investment decision and the perceived riski-ness: risk aversion, the probability that the coupon is outperformed by the indices or the probability that the barrier is touched. As had to expected by our hypothesis, only the latter played a significant role for the investment decision (Table 14) . Table 14 : Regression analysis results for the investment decision in the worst-of basket barrier reverse convertible or the underlying indices (top) and estimates for the perceived riskiness of the worst-of product (bottom). The only significant factor is in both cases the estimate for the probability to touch the barrier.
One could argue that it this observation is just a consequence of presenting both questions together: of course, when subjects estimate the probability for touching the barrier this also affects their decision and their perception of risk. If we had asked them to estimate a different factor that could influence their decision, they might have focused on that factor instead.
There are two arguments for the defend of our results: first, we had also asked the probability that the indices outperform the coupon, so this factor was also in the focus of the subjects. Nevertheless, this estimate did not influence their decisions significantly. Second, we can compare the investment decision instead with the estimated probabilities as displayed in Table 13 for SMI, S&P 500 and DAX. In fact, repeating the regression analysis for the investment decision in Table 14 with these estimates instead still gives a significant dependence.
We can conclude that the general attitude to underestimate the probability to touch a barrier for a basket is quite stable and that it makes worst-of certificates look less risky and more attractive.
Finally, we want to mention that the investment decisions are in fact not influenced by the correlation estimates. A regression analysis using the estimated correlation proxy as independent variable does not yield any significant effect on investment decision or risk perception of the worst-of basek product.
Can one de-bias investors?
Can we de-bias investors if we provide them additional information? One possibility would be to provide the crucial probability of touching a barrier to investors. To see whether this has an impact on the perception of risk and on investment decisions, we compare two similar bonus certificates: one on a non-specified index where the probability of touching the barrier was stated as the number the participant estimated for the DJIA and one on the DJIA where the real historic probability of touching the barrier was provided.
In both cases we asked the subjects to state the perceived riskiness of the product as well as whether they would like to invest into it. As has to be expected the logarithm of the relative difference of the two given probabilities (the real one for the DJIA and the estimate of the participant) affected the difference of perceived riskiness significantly (a linear regression has a p-value of 1.5%) and the difference of the investment decision was also significantly affected (p-value of less than 1%). What about when we look at the relative difference with respect to the probability to be below the barrier at maturity? We had identified this quantity as decisive for the investment decision, therefore we look at the investment decision for the DJIA with given (real) historic probability and compute the relative difference between the two probabilities (the real one for touching the barrier and the estimate for ending below at maturity). The logarithm of this difference has a significant effect on the investment decision (effect likelihood p-value is 0.026** for the nominal logistic regression): the larger the relative difference, the less likely is an investment into the bonus certificate. We can summarize that providing the crucial probabilities for the investment decisions in barrier products, namely, the probabilities that the barrier is touched and that the underlying is below the barrier at maturity, would help to de-bias investors. In principle this probabilities could easily be computed using historic data. There are, however, two questions that this approach raises: first, is this in the interest of the bank? Since otherwise there is no incentive to provide such additional information and there might be a need for regulations. Second, even if this probabilities were provided, would this really lead to better products for the customer?
The first question can lead to different answers: on the long run, banks should advise their clients well, in order to keep their reputation. On the short run, however, banks would likely sell substantially fewer barrier products if investors were de-biased. On the other hand we have seen that the attractiveness of barrier products is mostly induced not so much by an underestimation of the probability to touch the barrier, but rather by an overestimation for falling behind at maturity. Thus one could imagine that investors, knowing the real probabilities, would refrain from investing into barrier products, but would rather invest into different types of structured products. The drawback for the bank might be that these products typically have a smaller mispricing and hence a smaller markup for the bank (compare [4, 13] ).
The second question is difficult to answer. Historic probabilities are not future probabilities. As banks are searching nowadays for assets with low correlation to make worst-of basket products seemingly more appealing, they might as well search for assets that historically had a very low probability to touch a barrier, but for which the future probability is likely to be much higher. This is of course not possible for large indices as underlyings, since the number of such indices is too small to "optimize" successfully in this way. How is the impact of more readily available information on estimates regarding barriers? We tested this by presenting to the subjects a chart with the annually returns of the DJIA for the relevant time period (1987-2007), see Fig. 5 , and elicited the same probabilities as in Table 4 . The additional information improved the general estimates (Table 15 ). The relative difference, however -crucial for the decision to invest into a barrier product -was virtually unaffected: without giving explicit information about the probability to touch a barrier it seems not possible to de-bias investors sufficiently. This result suggests that it is general in the interest of the bank to provide information about the historic development of the stock market to their clients, since they might have on average too negative expectations that prevent them from investing altogether. Table 15 : Probability estimates without and with the additional information of the annually returns of the DJIA in the relevant period.
CONCLUSIONS
For barrier products we demonstrated that a relative underestimation of the probability that the barrier is touched leads to a positive investment decision. This bias affects the large majority of our sample. Barriers are not used in gains, since the effect is weaker there and it is better to cap the product, particularly since the chances for gains are systematically underestimated by the subjects. The observed pattern of probability mis-estimation can also explain why most structured products have at most one year time to maturity: longer investment horizons lead to a general over-estimation of potential losses, thus making such products seemingly less attractive. Fully capital protected products, on the other hand, profit from this bias and are therefore usually offered with a longer time to maturity. For worst-of baskets we found that, although the correlation of the underlying assets was quite well estimated by the subjects, they seemed not to apply this knowledge when estimating the probability that a barrier is touched by a worst-of basket. This resulted in gross underestimation of this probability. In fact, the estimated probability for the basket was never significantly above and in one case even significantly below the estimate for a comparable single asset! Investment decisions and perceived riskiness were significantly influenced by the estimates for this probability. This suggests that the attractiveness of worst-of basket products is based on an inability of investors to take the correlation effect into account when assessing the products. To de-bias investors it would be optimal to provide historic probabilities for both the probability to touch a barrier and the probability to end below the barrier at maturity. We noticed that this de-biasing does not necessarily have to be bad for the bank, even on the short-run, since investors who are aware of the true probabilities might be less pessimistic about the stock market development and thus would be more likely to invest -if not in barrier products then in other financial products. A de-biasing by only presenting past returns helps to improve generally the estimates, but not the relative difference between the probability to touch the barrier and being below at maturity, thus it is unlikely that the bias towards barrier products
